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This book is a defense of genetic engineering against 
"the Frankenstein thing." In his brief Introduction, 
Rollin tells us that "the Frankenstein story strikes a 
socially responsive chord, providing us with a way of 
articulating our fears and doubts about science and 
technology" (3-4). Nothing wrong with that, but "when 
and if the myth becomes reified or transformed into or 
equated with reality, [it] conceals nuances, shades, and 
subtleties of what it represents....The myth is either 
accepted as literal truth or categorically rejected as 
nonsense, with little thought for the possibilities in 
between, where the truth surely lies" (4). In all his work 
on animal protection, Rollin has been an aggressive, 
articulate, and effective champion of such middle 
ground possibilities, so no one familiar with his work 
will be surprised to find that this book begins by 
energetically toppling abolitionist objections to genetic 
engineering then maps out procedures for guiding such 
engineering toward beneficial results. IfRollin is correct 
that "genetic engineering of animals cannot be 
stopped-it is too simple and relatively inexpensive to 
accomplish" (4), his middle ground approach is the only 
effective expression for our Frankensteinian fears. 
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In Chapter 1, Rollin deals with "the first version" 
of "the Frankenstein thing," the contention that genetic 
engineering is intrinsically wrong. "There are certain 
things humans were not meant to do" (vii), and genetic 
engineering is one of them. His targets here are the 
media, scientific ideology, Jeremy Rifkin, Holmes 
Rolston, and anthropocentric theology. In its drive to 
sell its product, the media is driven to package all issues 
in "small, provocative bits" that "can be dramatically 
presented as black-and-white extremes" (7). Such 
successful packaging supplants careful analyses of the 
ethical dimensions of social policy issues. 
This is especially the case when those who are most 
familiar with the issue-because they are participants 
in it--<:ontend that what they are doing is "value-free." 
Scientists are fond of making this claim, so they can 
busily go about doing science without having to bother 
with thinking about the morality of what they are 
doing. Rollin delivers the swift kick in the rear that 
this head-down, ass-up ostrich pose invites and 
deserves. Rollin argues that such scientists confuse the 
fact that the truth of scientific statements does not 
depend on moral values with the fantasy that the 
enterprise of science-what objectives are pursued by 
scientists and what procedures are employed in that 
pursuit-does not depend on moral values. What 
scientists do is never value-free, although many 
scientists adamantly refuse to examine the values 
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presupposed in what they do, preferring to busy 
themselves in the laboratory instead. Unfortunately, they 
thus abandon the field to uninformed criticism of what 
they are doing. 
In the case ofgenetic engineering, one such criticism 
takes the form of contending that we should not play 
God, mess with nature, violate the sanctity of life, blur 
species distinctions, erode the special place of humans, 
and so forth. Rollin acknowledges that those who 
oppose genetic engineering on such grounds tend to 
present the wrongness of genetic engineering as 
self-evident, hence not in need of supporting argument. 
However, since these matters are not self-evident to him, 
Rollin looks for reasons that might lead one to conclude 
that genetic engineering is wrong irrespective of its 
consequences. In Jeremy Rifkin's work, he finds that 
genetic engineering is tarred with the brush of 
reductionism, i.e., viewing life as a bunch ofchemicals. 
Rollin points out that there is no logical link between 
genetic engineering and reductionism. Rollin then 
considers the possibility that genetic engineering is 
incompatible with the mind-set necessary for producing 
the good life for human beings, because it emphasizes 
the physical and forgets the personal dimensions of 
human life. Again, he answers that there is no logical 
connection here; if genetic engineering produces this 
result, it is only because we will have failed to give our 
scientists adequate humanistic education-something 
we are, apparently, already failing to do. 
Rollin concludes his critique of Rifkin on the same 
note with which he opens his critique of Rolston: the 
mystical value given to species cannot be justified. In 
the case of Rifkin, Rollin finds that he tries to have it 
both ways: he tries to be both a nominalist and a realist, 
blurring the difference in order to transfer the common 
sense value of separate individuals to separate species. 
In the case of Rolston, the confusions are several. First, 
he confuses our valuing things in themselves, as we do 
when we find them beautiful, with objective value, a 
value tllings would have in themselves regardless of 
whether anyone appreciated that value. Next Rolston 
commits a genetic fallacy by arguing that since humans, 
who are intrinsically valuable, are produced by nature, 
nature, too, must be intrinsically valuable. Finally, 
Rolston relies on a bad argument by analogy, arguing 
that since nonsentient nature is analogous to sentient 
beings, ithas the same, intrinsic value as sentient beings. 
Rollin clearly finds attempts, like Rolston's, to give 
intrinsic value to nonsentient nature to be worthless, 
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and, consequently, he also finds worthless those 
criticisms of genetic engineering based on its 
interference with supposedly intrinsically valuable 
elements of nature, such as species distinctions. 
Finally, Rollin points out that mixing human and 
animal parts is already standard practice in modern 
medicine, with, for example, pig valves being used to 
combat human heart disease. His general conclusion is 
that claims that genetic engineering is intrinsically 
wrong rest on unjustifiable, pseudo-religious categories 
and confused, dualistic thinking. The real worries about 
genetic engineering are consequential, giving rise to 
the second version of the Frankenstein thing: "genetic 
engineering of animals, although while [sicJnot wrong 
by its nature, is wrong because it is likely to produce 
significant harm" (66). Possible harm to humans is the 
subject of the second chapter of Rollin's book. 
While Rollin's criticisms of putative "inherent" 
values are certainly well-taken, the reader may still 
come away from Chapter 1 feeling that there is more to 
be said in defense of this first version of "the 
Frankenstein thing." At least part of what is meant by 
saying that human individuals have "inherent" value is 
that they should not be treated as commodities to be 
routinely sacrificed if a cost/benefit analysis indicates 
that the interests of the group would be enhanced by 
such sacrifice. The genetic engineering of animals 
embodies the idea that animals lack this sort of inherent 
value, for the genetic engineering of animals suggests 
that animals are commodities that may be invasively 
manipulated and reconstructed in order to make the 
exploitation of them for human benefit more efficient 
and profitable for human exploiters. Consequently, the 
reader may regret that in this discussion, Rollin did not 
address some of the mainstream animal liberation 
arguments for ascribing this sort of "inherent" value to 
animals. (In Chapter 3, Rollin raises the possibility that 
genetic engineering might make "us more prone to treat 
animals merely as tools for human use rather than as 
'ends in themselves,' whose fates matter to them as well 
as to us" (193).) 
Chapter 2 is actually two chapters. The last seven 
sections of the chapter are what one would expect from 
the lead-in at the end of Chapter 1: a discussion of the 
possible negative, even monstrous consequences of 
genetic engineering. These are grouped under 
headings of "Evolution in the fast lane," "Narrowing 
of the gene pool," "Unwittingly selecting for 
pathogens," "Genetically engineered disease models," 
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"Environmental," "Military applications," and 
"Socioeconomic concerns." These sections are 
fundamentally a catalogue of realistic dangers, with 
occasional commonsensical suggestions for how to try 
to minimize them and, in the case of military 
applications, a frank acknowledgment that the public, 
at least, is likely to have no opportunity to appraise the 
dangers and decide whether and, if so, how, such 
research should go forward. 
The first ten sections of this chapter are devoted, 
first. to a discussion of the difficulties with doing risk 
assessment, particularly with new technology, and, 
second and consequently, to a recommendation for the 
formation of democratic review committees to 
evaluate and guide genetic engineering. Rollin is 
sensitive to the public distrust of scientific expertise 
that has developed over the past two decades and to 
the fundamental role of nonscientific values in 
reviewing research. He believes that the only way to 
counterbalance "the arrogance of experts," who are 
professionally disinclined to appropriately weigh the 
dangers ofresearch, is to have local, citizen committees 
reviewing research proposals on a case-by-case basis. 
Having such committees would also both educate the 
public about realistic dangers-rather than fictive, 
Frankensteinian bogies-and provide the public 
reassurance that genetic engineering is not something 
that is being forced upon them, whether they approve 
or not. This public education and involvement should, 
Rollin believes, allay the public distrust of science, thus 
providing a win-win situation for both the research 
industry and the public. 
Animal liberationists will certainly find Rollin's 
discussion in this chapter unsatisfying. First, his 
presumption is that genetic engineering is going to go 
forward, elsewhere even if banned in the United States. 
Consequently, his concern is limited to regulating how it 
is done. He does not consider whether the possible 
dangers of genetic engineering---either in general or 
certain kinds of it-are so great that it/they should be 
prohibited. This "If we don't do it. somebody else will" 
focusing of ethical discussion on secondary, regulative 
issues can easily be an excuse for disregarding 
fundamental, moral values, and many readers may, 
consequently, find Rollin's discussion here shallow, even 
disquieting. (Interestingly, in Chapter 3, Rollin considers 
banning imports from countries lacking animal-welfare 
regulations (191); why couldn't the U.S. similarly flex 
its economic muscle to support prohibition?) 
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Second, Rollin's presumption is that the public's 
concern with the possibly dangerous consequences of 
genetic engineering is, at least in significant part, part 
of "the Frankenstein thing," Le., an unrealistic concern 
born of ignorance about genetic engineering. 
Consequently, a significant part of his concern in writing 
this chapter and in proposing democratic review 
committees is to "educate" the public out of this sort of 
distrust of genetic engineers and engineering. Since 
Rollin also emphasizes healthy skepticism about 
self-proclaimed "expert" judgments about risk 
assessments, readers may wonder if approaching these 
public concerns as part of "the Frankenstein thing" is 
at all appropriate and does not represent a subtle pro-
research bias. Approaching discussion of "ethical and 
social issues in the genetic engineering of animals" 
under the rubric of "The Frankenstein Syndrome" 
similarly bespeaks such a bias. 
Third, readers who shade more toward animal 
liberation than animal welfare will certainly be much 
more skeptical than Rollin about the effectiveness of 
his proposed review committees. His proposal is 
modeled on the institutional animal care and use 
committees mandated by the 1985 amendments to the 
Animal Welfare Act. Rollin, who helped write those 
amendments, apparently has a high regard for how those 
review committees are working; many animal 
liberationists have a low regard for the effectiveness of 
those committees. Certainly, the animal research 
community has been able to dominate those committees, 
and especially given the immense financial possibilities 
for genetic engineering and that review committees for 
this research would have to govern commercial as well 
as public research, it is difficult to believe that the 
genetic engineering industry would not insure its 
domination of these review committees. In response to 
Rollin's challenge, "What other option is there?," animal 
liberationists would likely propose possibilities that are 
much less friendly-less realistic, Rollin would 
doubtless say-to the research community. 
Chapter 3 focuses on "the plight of the creature," 
i.e., the welfare of animals affected by genetic 
engineering. Again, the chapter is divided into two 
discussions, the first concerning moral valuing of 
animals, the second concerning animal welfare 
problems posed by genetic engineering. While this 
chapter is again a defense of genetic engineering against 
"the Frankenstein thing"-the third aspect of this 
"thing" being the mistaken belief that "all genetic 
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engineering must hanD animals" (169)-that defense 
is here much more guarded. Rollin acknowledges that 
human prudence and self-interest in genetic engineering 
sometimes run contrary to what is best for the well-being 
of animals and that the corporate mentality underwriting 
the genetic engineering of animals has little interest 
either in animal welfare or with social concerns about 
animal welfare-<>r with any other social values that 
could adversely impact the efficient amassing ofwealth. 
Rollin begins the chapter with some very perceptive 
comments about how social ethics works and about the 
changing social ethic concerning animals. Prior to the 
last couple of decades, our social ethic concerning 
animals focused on cruelty to animals, but we now 
recognize that most of the suffering animals endure at 
our hands is not due to occasional acts ofcruelty; rather, 
it is the byproduct of our normal way of handling 
animals, particularly in factory farming and biomedical 
research. This recognition, in the context ofheightened 
sensitivity to all sorts of exploitation of defenseless 
groups, is leading us beyond anti-cruelty to a new social 
ethic for animals: society "now demands that we protect 
the animals' fundamental interests as determined by 
their natures" (158, a seven-fold unpacking of this on 
157-8). Although we continue to fail to acknowledge 
an interest in staying alive to be among those 
fundamental interests-something Rollin passes over 
in silence-Western society is coming to view 
minimizing, if not entirely eliminating, the pain and 
suffering ofanimals at human hands to be a moral duty, 
one to be enforced by law and to be fulfilled even when 
doing so may be expensive and inconvenient. 
Applying this new social ethic to genetic engineering 
gives rise to a regulatory principle to be employed by 
the review committees discussed in Chapter 2. Rollin 
calls this "the principle of conservation of welfare": 
"Any animals that are genetically engineered for 
human use or even for environmental benefit should 
be no worse off, in terms of suffering, after the new 
traits are introduced into the genome than the parent 
stock was prior to the insertion of the new genetic 
material" (179). Rollin discuses in considerable detail 
how employing this principle as law could both 
minimize the adverse impacts of genetic engineering 
on animals and reassure the public that this new 
industry was not developing with utter disregard of 
social values-again, a win-win solution. The one area 
of fundamental difficulty for applying this principle 
to such engineering occurs in the development of 
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animals carrying the genes that cause human disorders 
and then studying those animals, who will be suffering 
from those diseases. The only way to accommodate 
such studies to the principle of the conservation of 
welfare would be, Rollin acknowledges, to find some 
way to render the animals nonconscious, so they could 
not experience the suffering that is part of the disease. 
In an earlier discussion of possible solutions to animal 
welfare problems with factory farming, Rollin opined 
that society would not accept such nonconscious 
monsters. Here, however, since the human-diseased 
animals would be so beneficial to us, he believes that 
we will want them produced no matter what the cost 
in animal welfare; consequently, creating such 
monsters is the only way to prevent this sort of genetic 
engineering from causing massive animal suffering-
there are 3000 human genetic disorders available for 
injecting into animals, and at least as many genetic 
engineers salivating to do so. 
As always, Rollin insists on keeping ethical 
discussion practical. His starting point is that the genetic 
engineering ofanimals is going to continue and expand, 
and his concern is, then, how we can insure that the 
growing social commitment to minimizing animal 
suffering is not trampled under in the rush to the cheap 
food, medical miracles, and great profits promised by 
this new technology. Although he is optimistic that our 
new social ethic concerning animal welfare is strong 
enough to sustain significant regulation of genetic 
engineering for the animals' benefit, he is aware that 
much in our treaunent of animals shows us up as 
"mean-spirited, self-serving, exploitative beings" (193). 
The book concludes with brief discussions of 
animal patenting and the mechanics of genetic 
engineering. Rollin dismisses the patenting issue as 
an example ofhis Gresham's law for ethics: bad moral 
issues drive out good issues. In this case, a secondary 
issue has captured much media attention, even though 
the groundwork for deciding it has not been laid-
and the attention focused on this secondary issue has 
diverted energy away from laying that groundwork. 
The groundwork is, of course, the nest of issues 
discussed in this book. Until we decide the social! 
ethical issues Rollin raises, we cannot reasonably 
determine whether we should continue to regard 
animals as property and, even if we do so, what sorts 
of regulation we want to place on the use and treatment 
of such property. (Personally, Rollin believes that 
"animals should not legally be property, and the 
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arguments that applied to humans not being owned 
apply, mutatis mutandis, to animals" (209).) 
Bernie Rollin has devoted his life to ameliorating 
the condition of animals sacrificed in the agriculture 
and biomedical industries. He has thoughtfully analyzed 
where Western society is heading concerning animal 
welfare, and he has tirelessly pushed those in power to 
take the furthest step society is ready for toward 
respecting animal life and protecting animal interests. 
A great many animals have endured much less suffering 
thanks to Rollin's fine work. The Frankenstein 
Syndrome constitutes another important contribution 
to that work-and to the literature on genetic 
engineering in partiCUllar and practical ethics in general. 
While animal liberationists will find the book 
unsatisfying, because they do not accept Rollin's 
starting point-that the genetic engineering of animals 
is inevitable---avid genetic engineers, eager to do with 
their animals whatever they please, will find that Rollin 
is pushing for significant constraints on their work, 
protecting both humans and animals. They will also 
find that they are hard pressed to challenge the 
common sense and logic of his prudential social and 
animal welfare arguments. 
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